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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

I

I

I

/

No. 85-519

WILLIAM C. RANDALL, ROGER E. AUSTIN, TOM W.
ANDERSON AND MYREL A. NEUMANN, PETITIONERS v. B. J. LOFTSGAARDEN ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

\

[June-, 1986]

JusTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is ~er the recovery available
to a defrauded tax shelter investor, entitled under § 12(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933 or § 10(b) of the Securities Act of
1934 to rescind the fraudulent transaction or obtain rescissio~mages, must be reduced by ani tax benefits
the mvestornas received-from the tax s elter inv~t.

--

I In 1973, petitioners purchased interests in Alotel Associates (Associates), a limited partnership organized by respondent B. J. Loftsgaarden to build and operate a motel in
Rochester, Minnesota. Loftsgaarden was the president and
sole shareholder of respondent Alotel, Inc. (Alotel), which,
together with Loftsgaarden, was to be a general partner in
the venture.
Loftsgaarden marketed this $3.5 million project as a "tax
shelter," which would result in" 'significantly greater returns
for persons in relatively high income tax brackets."' Austin
v. Loftsgaarden (Austin 1), 675 F. 2d 168, 173 (CA8 1982).
As a partnership, Associates would not be taxed as an entity.
Rather, its taxable income and losses would pass through to
the limited partners, who would then be entitled to claim
their individual shares of the partnership's deductible losses
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to the extent of their adjusted basis in their partnership interests. 26 U. S. C. § 704(d). Especially attractive from
the high-income investor's perspective was the fact that "in a
real estate investment such as the one contemplated by
Loftsgaarden, the limited partner's basis is not restricted to
the amount of his actual investment (the amount 'at risk');
rather, it may be increased by the partner's proportional
share of any nonrecourse loans made to the partnership."
675 F. 2d, at 173. See 26 U.S. C. §465(c)(3)(D). Consequently, the individual limited partner may be able to claim
deductible partnership losses in amounts greatly in excess of
the funds invested, and offset those losses against other
income.
The initial offering memorandum indicated that Associates
would employ financing techniques designed to provide large
and immediate tax savings to the limited partners: a nonrecourse loan would finance the bulk of the project, and rapid
depreciation methods would be used to throw off large initial
losses. Nonetheless, the initial offering was unsuccessful,
and Loftsgaarden revised the plan and the offering memorandum to propose that Associates would rent land instead of
purchasing it, thereby incurring another deductible expense.
Petitioners subscribed to the second offering, investing from
$35,000 to $52,000 each. Associates soon began to experience financial difficulties, and in February 1975 Loftsgaarden
asked the limited partners to make additional loans to Associates; they complied, but initiated an investigation into the
partnership. Associates eventually defaulted on its obligations, and in 1978 the motel was foreclosed on by its
creditors.
Petitioners brought suit in the District Court in 1976,
alleging securities fraud and raising federal claims under
§ 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77l(2),
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR 240.10b-5, as well as
pendent state law claims. The jury found that respondents
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had knowingly made material misrepresentations and omissions in the revised offering memorandum, and that petitioners had reasonably relied on these material misstatements,
which caused their damages. AJpong other misstatements,
respondents had mischaracterized the financing available,
the terms of the land lease, and the manner and extent of
their compensation for services rendered. These findings
made respondents liable under§ 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and state
law. The District Court also accepted the jury's advisory
verdict that respondents were liable under § 12(2) for knowingly making material misrepresentations and omissions in
the offering memorandum which induced their purchases.
App. to Pet. for Cert. E-1.
Finding that petitioners' investments were worthless by
the time they discovered the fraud in 1975, the District Court
held that the remedy of rescission was proper under § 12(2),
which provides that an investor harmed by prospectus fraud
may sue "to recover the consideration paid for such security
with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if
he no longer owns the security." 15 U. S. C. § 77l(2). Rescission was permissible, the court ruled, notwithstanding
that petitioners had not made a tender of their securities to
respondents until shortly before trial. App. to Pet. for Cert.
E-15. Accordingly, the District Court entered judgment for
petitioners in the amount of the consideration paid for the
limited partnership units, together with prejudgment interest; it also noted that each of the counts found by the jury
would independently support respondents' liability, but that
"each plaintiff is entitled only to a single recovery." App. to
Pet. for Cert. E-16. The District Court rejected respondents' contention that petitioners' recovery should be offset by
tax benefits received, concluding that "[a]bsent [respondents'] fraud, which induced their purchases, [petitioners]
would probably have made other investments which pro-

'·'
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duced temporary ta savings, but without the total loss of
their investme ." App. to Pet. for Cert. F-9--F-10.
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sustained respondents' liability under § 12(2) and § 10(b), but
reversed the rescissionary award and remanded for a new
trial on that issue. The panel rejected respondents' claim
that petitioners were not entitled to rescission under § 12(2)
because they had made no tender of their partnership interests until shortly before trial, 675 F. 2d, at 179, agreeing with
the District Court's "decision to apply what was essentially a
rescissory measure of damages in this case." !d., at 181.
The panel held, however, that the District Court had erred in
refusing to reduce "the damage award" by an amount equal
to any tax benefits received by petitioners "on account of the
investment." Ibid.
In the panel's view, an "actual damages principle," applicable both to § 12(2) and § 10(b), required that an award of
rescission or of rescissionary damages be "'red~ceQ. by any
value ~iY...ed as a result of the fraudulent Tran~:tion.'"
!d., at 181 (quoting Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.
2d 1357, 1361 (CAS 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 951 (1978)).
The panel observed that the benefits anticipated from a successful real estate tax shelter typically include tax savings to
the limited partner in the early years, followed by income in
later years, and reasoned that "unlike a corporate shareholder, ... even if the enterprise fails to become profitable,
the limited partner clearly may have something of value because of the investment's unique tax treatment." I d., at
182. In light of "the value of the tax deductions generated
by such an investment," the panel held that "the strictly compensatory nature of damages awardable in private securities
fraud actions requires that such value be taken into account
in determining whether and to what extent damages were inflicted upon plaintiffs." I d., at 183. Finally, the panel
rejected petitioners' objection that "because there are tax
consequences to any investment one makes, evidence of those
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consequences will now figure in every securities fraud case,"
and asserted that its holding was limited to "cases involving
investments that are expressly marketed and sold as tax
shelters." Ibid.
/
On remand, the "f>istrict Court held a bench trial on the
issue of tax benefits, and calculated each petitioner's damages as the purchase price of his partnership interest plus
simple interest, minus net tax benefits. App. to Pet. for
Cert. C-5. Both petitioners and respondents appealed from
the District Court's judgment, and, after a second panel
ruled on various subsidiary issues, the Court of Appeals
reconsidered the case en bane. Austin v. Loftsgaarden
(Austin 11), 768 F. 2d 949 (CA8 1985).
Relying in part on the law of the case, and noting that the
Second Circuit had reached a similar result in Salcer v.
Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F. 2d 935 (1984), cert. pending,
\ No. 84-1447, the Court of Appeals adhered to the Austin I
panel's holding that an award of rescission or of rescissionary
damages to a defrauded tax shelter investor should be reduced by any tax benefits actually received. This offset,
moreover, was required whether the award stemmed from liability under§ 10(b) or§ 12(2). 768 F. 2d, at 953-954. As to
§ 10(b), the Court of Appeals relied on § 28(a) of the 1934 Act,
which provides that "no person permitted to maintain a suit
for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall
recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more
actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on
account of the act complained of." 15 U. S. C. § 78bb(a).
As to § 12(2), the court acknowledged that "the words 'actual
damages' do not appear in the 1933 Act," but suggested that
the rescission remedy provided by section 12(2) had been,
and should be, construed as
"substantially equivalent to the damages permitted
under section 28(a). Cf. Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U. S. 128, 155 (1972). The goal of
rescission under section 12(2) is to return the parties to

85-519---0PINION
6

RANDALL~LOFTSGAARDEN

the status quo ante, 'and hence a plaintiff can recover no
more than his or her net economic loss, i. e., actual damages.'" 768 F. 2d, at 954 (quoting Salcer, supra, at
940).
Although the Court of Appeals recognized that "tax benefits
are not a form of income in a strict accounting sense," 768 F.
2d, at 955, it nonetheless concluded, in light of its interpretation of§ 28(a) and of the purposes of the rescission remedy,
that t~abenfits are "income received" within the meaning of
8 F. 2d, at 954-955.
§ 12(2).
The ourt of Appeals then proceeded to engage in a detailed analysis of the manner in which petitioners'
rescissionary damages should be determined. The court
ruled that prejudgment interest should not have been based
on the total consideration paid by each petitioner, but rather
on the amount by which each was "'out-of-pocket' during
each year of the investment." 768 F. 2d, at 958. The court
then determined that under its theory the tax consequences
flowing from petitioners' recovery of damages, as well as the
tax benefits themselves, should be taken into account in
determining damages. Accordingly, it doubled the total
damages award, including prejudgment interest, to reflect
the fact that each petitioner was in the 50% income tax
bracket. 768 F. 2d, at 960-961. The combined effect of the
Austin II court's several rulings was this: under the
rescissionary approach originally employed by the District
Court, petitioners would have been entitled to total recoveries ranging from $64,610 to $96,385, App. to Pet. for Cert.
B-1-B-2; under the Court of Appeals' final ruling, petitioners could recover only amounts ranging from $506 to $7,666.
768 F. 2d, at 961.
Two judges dissented from the Court of Appeals' adherence to the panel's holding in Austin I. In their view, tax
benefits could not plausibly be viewed as "income received"
within the meaning of§ 12(2), and the effect of allowing a tax
benefit offset was to provide "a windfall to the defendant-

t
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the fraudulent party." 768 F. 2d, at 963 (Lay, C. J., dissenting). We granted certiorari because of the question's importance to the administration of the federal tax and securities
laws, and because the Courts of Appeals are divided in their
treatment of tax benefits for purposes of calculating damages
in federal securities fraud litigation. See Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F. 2d 826, 838 (CA91984) (refusing to reduce
damages by taXisl~efits received in an action under § lO(b)).
We now reverse.
II
Section 12(2) specifies the conduct that gives rise to liability for prospectus fraud and expressly creates a private right
of action in favor of the defrauded investor, who "may sue
either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security
with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if
he no longer owns the security." 15 U. S. C. § 77l(2).
Thus, § 12(2) prescribes the remedy of rescission except
where the plaintiff no longer owns the security. See Wigand
v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 F. 2d 1028, 1035 (CA2 1979). Even in
the latter situation, we may assume that a rescissionary
measure of damages will be employed; the plaintiff is entitled
to a return of the consideration paid, reduced by the amount
realized when he sold the security and by any "income received" on the security. See H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 9 (1933) (under § 12, the buyer can "sue for recovery
of his purchase price, or for damages not exceeding such
price"); L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 1020
(1983) (hereinafter Loss) ("when the plaintiff in § 12 no longer
owns the security, damages are to be measured so as to result in the substantial equivalent of rescission").
Petitioners contend that § 12(2)'s "income received" language clearly excludes tax benefits received pursuant to a
tax shelter investment because tax benefits are not "a form of
income in a strict accounting sense," Austin II, 768 F. 2d, at

i
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955 (footnote omitted), and are not taxed as such. Accordingly, petitioners argue that tax benefits cannot offset a
rescissionary award under § 12(2).
Here, as in oth~r contexts, the starting point in construing
a statute is the language of the statute itself. E . g., Santa
Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 477 (1977).
Moreover, "if the language of a provision of the securities
laws is sufficiently clear in its context and not at odds with
the legislative history, it is unnecessary 'to examine the additional considerations of "policy" ... that may have influenced
the lawmakers in their formulation of the statute.'" Aaron
v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 695 (1980) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 214, n. 33 (1976). Section 12(2),
we think, speaks with the clarity necessary to invoke this
"plain language" canon: § 12(2)'s offset for "income received"
on the security does not encompass the tax benefits received
by defrauded investors by virtue of their ownership of the security, because such benefits cannot, under any reasonable
definition, be termed "income."
The tax benefits attributable to ownership of a security initially take the form of tax deductions or tax credits. These
have no value in themselves; the economic benefit to the investor-the true "tax benefit"-arises because the investor
may offset tax deductions against income received from other
sources or use tax credits to reduce the taxes otherwise payable on account of such income. Unlike payments in cash or
property received by virtue of ownership of a security-such
as distributions or dividends on stock, interest on bonds, or a
limited partner's distributive share of the partnership's capital gains or profits-the "receipt" of tax deductions or credits
is not itself a taxable event, for the investor has received no
money or other "income" within the meaning of the Internal
Revenue Code. See 26 U. S. C. § 61. Thus, we would require compelling evidence before imputing to Congress an intent to describe the tax benefits an investor derives from tax
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deductions or credits attributable to ownership of a security
as "income received thereo.rV"
This Court's decision in rJnited Housing Foundatio'fl,, Inc.
v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 (1975), lends additional su port to
our conclusion that the economic value of tax deduct ons and
tax credits in the hands of a particular investor is not "income
received" on a security for purposes of § 12(2). In orman,
the Court rejected a claim that shares in certain housing
projects must be deemed to be "securities" because f "the
deductibility for tax purposes of the portion of the m ~thly
rental charge applied to interest on the mortgage," which
was said to constitute "an expectation of 'income."' Id., at
854-855. To the contrary, the Court found "no basis in law
for the view that the payment of interest, with its consequent
deductibility for tax purposes, constitutes income or profits."
I d., at 855. In this case, we reject the analogous suggestion
that the tax deductions petitioners were entitled to take by
virtue of their partnership interests "constitut[e] income or
profits." I d., at 855.
Respondents have produced no specific evidence from the
sparse legislative history of§ 12(2) to establish that Congress
intended tax benefits to be treated as "income received."
Instead, respondents urge that we look to the nature of the
equitable remedy of rescission, which they say is exclusively
"an effort to restore the status quo ante." Brief for Respondents 27. Under this interpretation of rescission, respondents maintain, "any person demanding the rescission of
a contract to which he is a party must restore or offer to
restore to the other party whatever he may have received
under the contract in the way of money, property, or other
consideration or benefit." Ibid. (quoting 2 H. Black, Black
on Rescission and Cancellation § 617, at p. 1417 (1916)). Petitioners' tax benefits, respondents argue, constitute such
"consideration or benefit."
Generalities such as these-which come to us unsupported
by any instance in which a common law court treated tax

t
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benefits as consideration or property that must be returned
or offset against the plaintiff's recovery in rescission-fall far
short of the showing required to overcome the plain language
of§ 12(2). Moreover, even at common law, it is quite likely
that tax benefits would be ignored for purposes of a rescissionary remedy. Under the "direct product" rule, the
party seeking rescission was required to credit the party
against whom rescission was sought only with gains that
were the "direct product" of the property the plaintiff had
acquired under the transaction to be rescinded: "The phrase
'direct product' means that which is derived from the ownership or possession of the property without the intervention of
an independent transacti€1n by the possessor." Restatement
of Restitution § 157 comment b (1937). We agree with
amici, the United States and the SEC, that tax benefits,
because they accrue only if the tax deductions or credits the
investment throws off are combined with income genera:ted
by the investor or taxes owed on such income, would in all
likelihood not have been deemed a "direct product" of the security at common law. See Brief for the United States ~nd
the SEC 13. Cf. Cereal Byproducts Co. v. Hall, 147 N. E.
2d 383 (Ill. App.), aff'd, 155 N. E. 2d 14 (1958) (refusing to
reduce damages for an accountant's negligence in discovering
an embezzlement of plaintiff by the amount of the tax benefits plaintiff received by virtue of the theft). Respondents
offer no reason to think that in enacting § 12(2) Congress intended to curtail the investor's recovery by relaxing the limit
on offsets imposed by the "direct product" rule.
Respondents' view of the purposes served by § 12(2)'s rescission remedy is likewise flawed. Certainly a restoration
of the plaintiff to his position prior to the fraud is one goal
that will generally be served by § 12(2), as by common law
rescission or restitution. But the 1933 Act is intended to do
more than ensure that defrauded investors will be compensated: the Act also "aim[s] ... to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and

•
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worthless securities through misrepresentation [and] to place
adequate and true information before the investor." S. Rep.
No. 47, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). See also United
States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 775-776 (1979). We may
therefore infer that Congress chose a rescissionary remedy
when it enacted § 12(2) in order to deter prospectus fraud and
encourage full disclosure as well as to make investors whole.
Indeed, by enabling the victims of prospectus fraud to demand rescission upon tender of the security, Congress shifted
the risk of an intervening decline in the value of the security
to defendants, whether or not that decline was actually
caused by the fraud. See Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule lOb--5: A Restitution Alternative To Tort
Damages, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 349, 369 (1984) (hereinafter
Thompson); Loss, supra, at 1133. Thus, rescission adds an
additional measure of deterrence as compared to a purely
compensatory measure of damages.
We also reject, as did the Court of Appeals, 768 F. 2d, at
958, respondents' alternative contention that tax benefits
constitute "a return of, or a reduction in, 'consideration.'"
Brief for Respondents 29-30. There is no indication that
Congress intended the word "consideration" in § 12(2) to
mean anything other than what the context would suggestthe money or property given by the investor in exchange for
the security. And, in view of the express offset for "income
received," we think any implicit offset for a return of consideration must be confined to the clear case in which such
money or property is returned to the investor. Here, the
consideration given by petitioners in exchange for their partnership interests took the form of money, not tax deductions,
and the fact that petitioners' received tax deductions from
which they were able to derive tax benefits therefore cannot
constitute a return of that consideration. Accordingly, we
hold that § 12(2) does not authorize an offset of tax benefits
received by a defrauded investor against the investor's
rescissionary recovery, either as "income received" or as a

85-519-0PINION
12

RANDALLv.LOFTSGAARDEN

return of "consideration," and that this is so whether or not
the security in question is classified as a tax shelter.

III
We now consider whether § 28(a) should alter our conclusion that § 12(2) does not authorize a reduction in the plaintiff's recovery in the amount of tax benefits received, and
whether § 28(a) requires such an offset when a rescissionary
measure of damages is applied to a plaintiff's § 10(b) claim.
Respondents suggest that § 12(2) and § 28 should be construed in pari materia, arguing that the Court of Appeals
correctly determined that § 28(a) stands for a broad principle
that recovery under the federal securities laws is strictly limited to the defrauded investor's "actual damages," and hence
that anything of economic value received by the victim of
fraud as a result of the investment must be used to reduce
the victim's recovery. This principle, they say, requires us
to construe § 12(2)'s express offset for "income received" on
the security as encompassing any tax benefits received by
petitioners.
The Court of Appeals relied on Globus v. Law Research
Service, Inc., 418 F. 2d 1276 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 397
U. S. 913 (1970), which read § 17(a) of the 1933 Act in pari
materia with § 28(a) insofar as the latter provision is deemed
to bar punitive damages. See 768 F. 2d, at 954. Assuming
arguendo that Globus was correctly decided, it is clearly
distinguishable, for any private right of action under § 17(a)
would be an implied one, and § 17(a) makes no reference to
damages, whether punitive or compensatory. See id., at
1283-1284. By contrast, Congress addressed the matter of
prospectus fraud with considerable specificity in § 12(2),
which not only antedates § 28(a), but was also left untouched
by Congress when it passed the 1934 Act. See Loss, supra,
at 1024. We therefore decline to read § 28(a) as mandating a
limit on the rescission remedy created by Congress in the
1933 Act by enactment of § 12(2). To hold otherwise would
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be to effect a partial repeal of § 12(2) by implication, and "[i]t
is, of course, a cardinal principle of statutory construction
that repeals by implication are not favored." Radzanower v.
Touche, Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 154 (1976) (quoting
United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U. S.
164, 168 (1976). There is no "irreconcilable conflict" here
between the two Acts, nor is this a case in which "the later
act covers the whole situation of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute." Id., at 154, quoting Posadas v.
National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936). Cf. Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 384 (1983) (adopting a "cumulative construction of the remedies under the
1933 and 1934 Acts").
The issue whether and under what circumstances rescission or a rescissionary measure of damages is available under
§ 10(b) is an unsettled one. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U. S. 128, 155 (1972), which involved violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by a buyer of securities,
this Court held that ordinarily "the correct measure of damages under § 28 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78bb(a), is the difference between the fair value of all that the [plaintiff] received
and the fair value of what he would have received had there
been no fraudulent conduct." Courts have also generally applied this "out-of-pocket" measure of damages in§ 10(b) cases
involving fraud by a seller of securities, see, e. g., Harris v.
American Investment Co., 523 F. 2d 220, 225 (CA8 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1054 (1976); Thompson, supra, at 365.
But there is authority for allowing the § 10(b) plaintiff, at
least in some circumstances, to choose between "undoing the
bargain (when events since the transaction have not made rescission impossible) or holding the defendant to the bargain
by requiring him to pay [out-of-pocket] damages." Loss,
supra, at 1133. See, e. g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F. 2d
891, 909 (CA9 1975) ("[w]hile out of pocket loss is the ordinary standard in a 10b-5 suit, it is within the discretion of the
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district judge in appropriate circumstances to apply a rescissory measure").
Respondents do not dispute that rescission or a rescissionary measure of damages may sometimes be appropriate
under § 10(b), nor do they dispute that in this case a
rescissionary recovery is appropriate on petitioners' § 10(b)
claims as well as on their § 12(2) claims. Instead, they contend that § 28(a) strictly limits any such rescissionary recovery to the plaintiff's net economic harm. We shall therefore
assume arguendo that a rescissionary recovery may sometimes be proper on a § 10(b) claim, and that this is such a
case.
In enacting § 28(a), Congress did not specify what was
meant by "actual damages." It is appropriate, therefore, to
look to "the state of the law at the time the legislation was
enacted," for guidance in defining the scope of this limitation.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith v. Curran, 456
U. S. 353, 378 (1982). When § 28(a) was enacted § 12(2)
stood as a conspicuous example of a rescissionary remedy,
and we have found that Congress did not intend that a recovery in rescission under § 12(2) be reduced by tax benefits
received. Accordingly, we think § 28(a) should not be read
to compel a different result where rescissionary damages are
obtained under § 10(b).
Even apart from the analogy furnished by § 12(2), this
Court has never interpreted § 28(a) as imposing a rigid requirement that every recovery on an express or implied right
of action under the 1934 Act must be limited to the net economic harm suffered by the plaintiff. To be sure, this Court
has noted that "Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act . . . limits recovery in any private damages action brought under the 1934
Act to 'actual damages,"' Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 734 (1975), and Affiliated Ute Citizens
clearly interpreted § 28(a) as governing the measures of damages that are permissible under §10(b). 406 U.S., at 155.
But the Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens also indicated that
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"where the defendant received more than the seller's actual
loss ... damages are the amount of the defendant's profit."
406 U. S., at 155. This alternative standard aims at preventing the unjust enrichment of a fraudulent buyer, and it
clearly does more than simply make the plaintiff whole for
the economic loss proximately caused by the buyer's fraud.
Indeed, the accepted rationale underlying this alternative is.
simply that "[i]t is more appropriate to give the defrauded
party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraudulent
party keep them." Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F. 2d 781, 786
(CAl), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 879 (1965). See also Falk v.
Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199, 135 N. E. 243 (1922) (Cardozo, J.).
Thus, the mere fact that the receipt of tax benefits, plus a full
recovery under a rescissionary measure of damages, may
place a§ lO(b) plaintiff in a better position than he would have
been in absent the fraud, does not establish that the flexible
limits of § 28(a) have been exceeded.
In any case, respondents' contention that plaintiffs will receive undeserved "windfalls" absent an offset for tax benefits
is greatly overstated. Even if tax benefits could properly be
characterized as a windfall-which we doubt-the tax laws
will serve to reduce, although not necessarily to eliminate,
the extent of plaintiffs' net economic gain as compared to the
status quo ante. We are told that the "tax benefit rule" will
apply in cases of rescission, thus making the recovery taxable
as ordinary income. See Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U. S. 370 (1983); Brief for the United States
and the SEC 25. Any residual gains to plaintiffs thus
emerge more as a function of the operation of the Internal
Revenue Code's complex provisions than of an unduly generous damages standard for defrauded investors.
Respondents also overlook the fact that Congress' aim in
enacting the 1934 Act was not confined solely to compensating defrauded investors. Congress intended to deter fraud
and manipulative practices in the securities markets, and to
ensure full disclosure of information material to investment
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decisions. Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U. S., at 151; see also
Herman & MacLean, 459 U. S., at 386-387. This deterrent
purpose is ill-served by a too rigid insistence on limiting
plaintiffs to recovery of their "net economic loss." Salcer,
744 F. 2d, at 940. The effect of allowing a tax benefit offset
would often be substantially to insulate those who commit securities frauds from any appreciable liability to defrauded investors. The resulting diminution in the incentives for tax
shelter promoters to comply with the federal securities laws
would seriously impair the deterrent value of private rights
of action, which, we have emphasized, "provide 'a most effective weapon in the enforcement' of the securities laws and are
a 'necessary supplement to Commission action.'" Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards Inc. v. Berner,-- U. S. - - , - (1985) (quoting J . I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432
(1964)).
The Court of Appeals' elaborate method for calculating
damages and interest so as to offset tax benefits supplies an
additional reason for rejecting its tax benefit offset rule. We
need not inquire whether evidence concerning tax benefits is
ordinarily so speculative as to be beyond the jury's province.
Cf. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U. S. 490
(1980). It is enough that there are formidable difficulties in
predicting the ultimate treatment of the investor's claimed
tax benefits, whether or not an audit has commenced, and
that the burdens associated with reconstruction of the investor's tax history for purposes of calculating interest are
substantial. We think that § 28(a) cannot fairly be read to
require such a full-scale inquiry into a defrauded investor's
dealings with the tax collector lest the investor escape with
anything more than his "net economic loss."
Respondents' sole remaining contention is that a rule requiring the offset of tax benefits is required in view of "the
economic reality of tax benefits produced by tax shelters."
Brief for Respondents 14. They maintain that since "tax
benefits to the partner represent an important tangible eco-
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nomic advantage expected to be derived from his investment," Salcer, 744 F. 2d, at 940, Congress must have intended that tax benefits would reduce the plaintiff's allowable
recovery under § 28(a). In support of their version of "economic reality," respondents note that the return from a tax
shelter investment may be analyzed as consisting of "cash
flow, tax benefits and appreciation equity value," R. Haft &
P. Fass, 4 Tax Sheltered Investments, Intro. 8-9 (3rd ed.
1981), and that some courts have held that investors may sue
for fraud where a tax shelter investment has not produced
promised tax benefits. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand,
649 F. 2d 175 (CA3 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 938 (1982).
We have already established that Congress did not design
§ 12(2) to accomodate these arguments, and that § 28(a) does
not place them on a surer footing. Respondents essentially
ask us to treat tax benefits as a separate asset that is acquired when a limited partner purchases a share in a tax shelter partnership. But the legal form of the transaction does
not reflect this treatment. Petitioners purchased securities,
thereby acquiring freely alienable rights to any income that
accrued to them by virtue of their ownership. They did not,
however, also acquire a separate, freely transferable bundle
of tax losses that would have value apart from petitioners'
status as partners. For obvious reasons, tax deductions and
tax credits are not, in the absence of a statutory provision to
the contrary, freely transferable from one person to another
if wholly severed from the property or activity to which they
relate: "[t]he statutes pertaining to the determination of taxable income ... disclos[e] a general purpose to confine allowable losses to the taxpayer sustaining them, i. e., to treat
them as personal to him and not transferable to or usable by
another." New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S.
435, 440 (1934). Accordingly, we decline to treat these tax
losses as so much property created by the promoters of the
partnership. It is for Congress, not this Court, to decide
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whether the federal securities laws should be modified to
comport with respondents' version of economic reality.
We acknowledge that, absent an offset for tax benefits,
plaintiffs may have an incentive to wait to raise their § 12(2)
claims until they have received the bulk of the tax benefits
available from a tax shelter, since after their securities are (
tendered they will cease to receive tax benefits. We are not
persuaded, however, that courts lack adequate means to deal
with any potential for abuse on this score. In cases under
§ 10(b), some courts have barred plaintiffs from electing rescission, or a rescissionary measure of damages, where they
delayed tender or suit in order to increase their expected recovery should the market decline. See, e. g., Baumel v.
Rosen, 412 F. 2d 571, 574-575 (CA4 1969); Loss, supra, at
1133, n. 127; Thompson, supra, at 369-370. A similar rule
may well be appropriate where plaintiffs delay tender or suit
in order to obtain additional tax benefits, although we need
not so decide today.
We also have no occasion in this case to decide whether,
assuming that a rescissionary recovery may sometimes be
proper under§ 10(b), plaintiffs in such cases should invariably
be free to elect a rescissionary measure of damages rather
than out-of-pocket damages. Consequently, we do not consider whether courts may ever refuse to allow a rescissionary
recovery under§ 10(b) where the "premium" for expected tax
benefits represented a large portion of the purchase price, in
which event the out-of-pocket measure might yield a significantly smaller recovery. See Salcer, 744 F. 2d, at 940, and
n. 5. In this case, a rescissionary measure of damages was
determined to be proper, and respondents have abandoned
their intitial challenge to that ruling.
We conclude, then, that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that § 28(a) requires a rescissionary recovery under
§ 12(2) or § 10(b) to be reduced by tax benefits received from
a tax shelter investment. The judgment is reversed and the

I

I

'

.
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case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
November 8, 1985, Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
Cert to CAB
(per curiam) (Heaney cone.
diss.) (Lay diss. + 1)

No. 85-519-CFX
WILLIAM C. RANDALL, et al.
(Drs. in unsuccessful tax
shelter)

&

v.
B.J. LOFTSGAARDEN, et al. (individual & corporate offerors)
./1 .;.., w
, 1 VV"'~

Federal/Civil

Timely

t o./'t:{{;,. '' J\ U ~:)T l"' 1[ n
___.,._

1.

SUMMARY:

This petition presents the same issue as

No. 85-377, Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture and No. 84-1447,

~er

v. Envicon Equities Corp., on the discuss list for November 1 (Do
"---~

favorable

tax

"~USTlN 1[''

.

'~.

consequences

to

a

defrauded

"\\-\•~

(

investor

offset

rescissionary

damages

awarded

under

federal

securities

laws?).

Petrs also challenge the Eight Circuit 1 s

holding that favorable

tax consequences

the

when

the

must

investors 1

be

deducted

purchase of

from

the

shelter

consideration paid
is

rescinded when

calculating damages under Section 12(2).
2.

FACTS

$152,000 in resps

1

AND

DECISION

BELOW:

Petrs

invested

limited partnership that was to construct and

operate a Ramada Inn and offer tax benefits to petrs.
opened
cost.

several

over

months

behind

schedule

and

The Ramada

substantially

over

The hotel incurred large operating losses, and resps asked

petrs to extend several large
audit revealed several frauds.
purge of management

failed,

loans to prevent insolvency.

An

Efforts at resuscitation after a

despite the

infusion of additional

capital.
Petrs sought recovery under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15

u.s.c. S

77~(2).

That section provides in

pertinent part:
"Any person who-(2) offers or sells a security [through the mails
and by misstating or omitting a material fact],
shall be liable to the person purchasing such
security from him, who may sue either at law
or in equity in any court of competent
juridiction, to recover the consideration
paid for such security with interest thereon,
less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for
damages if he no longer owns the security."
A jury found resps guilty of several violations of securities laws.
i ty,

The Eight Circuit affirmed the findings of liabil-

but vacated

the award of damages and remanded to the dis-

trict court in a holding similar to th9se of Salcer and Freschi.
Alstin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 16S (CAS 19S2)
On remand,
benefits

the district cou r t

from their damage

awards.

(Austin I).

deducted plaintiffs'

On appeal,

tax

a panel of the

Eighth Circuit sua sponte issued an order setting two issues for
en bane consideration:

Whether

tax benefits should offset dam-

ages; and how any offset was to be applied in calculations.
The Eighth Circuit en bane held that Section 12 ( 2)
the Securities Act of 1933, 15

u.s.c.

S

77~(2)

implicitly incor-

porated an "actual damages n principle.

Austin v.

76S F.2d 949,

(Austin II).

954

(CAS 19S5)

(en bane)

of

Loftsqaarden,
The court

relied on the "actual damages" language in Section 2S(a) of the
1934 Act.
~

Courts have construed

remedy provided by Section 12(2)

the recission and restitution
as substantially equivalent to

the damages permitted under Section 28(a).
of recission under Section 12(2)

Id.

Because the goal

is to return the parties to the

status quo ante, "a plaintiff can recover no more than his or her
'net ecomonic loss.'"

Id.

On the second issue for en bane consideration, the court
recomputed damages to allow for

interest only on the amount of

money that each plaintiff was out-of-pocket during each year of
the investment, rather than granting interest on the total amount
of consideration paid by each plaintiff from the date paid until
the date of judgment.
be doubled

so

that

The court also held that damages were to

plaintiffs,

bracket, could be made whole.

who were

in

the

fifty

percent

An additional opinion by the panel (Lay, Ross & Millian)
performed mop-up on details of the litigation that are not before
this Court.
Judges Lay and Bright dissented from the en bane holding.

They argued that the majority erred in determining that tax

benefits were "income received" in computing recissionary damages
because tax benefits are not really a reduction in income tax,
but a deferral of taxes.

The benefit to the investor of these

deferrals depends on the ultimate date of reckoning and the investor •s

income

tax bracket in future years.

The dissent also

argued that reduction of damages for tax benfits allowed the resp
to retain profits he obtained from the defrauded investors.
nally,

Fi-

the dissent disagreed with the doubling of the award to

make plaintiffs whole:

The statute requires the court to retore

the consideration paid to the defrauded investor, with interest,
less any income actually received from the investment."

Id. at

963.
Judge

Heaney also dissented,

arguing

that

the en bane

court should not have overruled its now-inconsistent holding in
Hayden v. McDonald, 742 F.2d 423 (CAS 1984), an action similar to
this one, but based on Minnesota securities laws.

[That issue is

Circuit housekeeping and is not before this Court.]
3.
the

CONTENTIONS:

arguments

made

This petition in part elaborates upon

in Salcer

and

Freschi.

Because

the

Eighth

Circuit relied extensively on statutes as well as on the policy
considerations raised by the Second Circuit, however, this petition has focused

in more tightly on the statutory underpinnings

Petr contends that under section 12 (2),

of this offset rule.

courts are commanded to reduce damages only by "income received"
from the fraudulently sold securities.

The Eighth Circuit's in-

terpretation stretches "income" beyond the commonly accepted definitions of the term.

Moreover, under the terms of the statute,

plaintiffs are to be awarded "consideration with interest thereon."

The

Eighth

Circuit's

more

restrictive

award

of

interest

only on the amounts they were out-of-pocket at any given time is
inconsistent with this language.
Petr also contends that the Eighth Circuit's reliance on
the "actual damages" language of section 28(a)

is misplaced, and

the phrase must be read with the provision as a whole.
28(a)

Section

was to prevent a plaintiff from recovering more than once

if he pursues both federal and state causes of action.
Petr also points out that the result in this cases is
inconsistent with

the collateral

source rule,

under which pay-

ments or benefits from another party are not credited against the
tortfeasor 's liability,

although

they cover all or part of the

harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.

The Eighth Circuit held

that the tax benefits did not fall within the scope of the collateral source doctrine because they emanated directly from the
shelter

investments:

petrs contend

that

the proper question is

whether the benefit comes from respondents.
Finally,

petr

makes arguments

petitions for Salcer and Freschi:

(1)

similar

to those

in the

"Actual damages" should be

interpreted in the same way that the phrase has been interpreted
in federal copyright and trademark statutes;

(2)

The credit for

tax benefits against resps' damages lessen
the judgment resp will
' .
have to pay and thereby diminishes an incentive against securities fraud.
4.

DISCUSSION:

This case is the best of the three for

the resolution of the issue of whether tax benefits should offset
damages in a recissionary action under federal securities laws.
The discussions in both Second Circuit panels are less complete
than in this en bane opinion.
trated on motivations for

While the Second Circuit concen-

tax shelters and

investors' goals

in

those ventures,

the Eighth Circuit concentrated on the language

of the statute.

Austin II discussed not only the "actual dam-

ages" rationale for the holding, but went on to rest their holding

squarely

on

the

language

of

the

statute

by

determining

whether the tax benefits consituted "income received" within the
meaning of section 12(2).
Austin II also has more complete discussions of the "Tax
Benefit

Rule"

and

the collateral sources

rule

(Austin

Salcer as a starting point for both discussions).
cause

Austin

II

reaches

is

proceeded
issues

farther

inherent

in

than

the

II

uses

Moreover, beSecond Circuit

cases,

it

the question before

this

Court,

but which were not presented to the Second Circuit: are

tax benefits a return of consideration under 12(2)? does prejudgment

interest

apply

to consideration paid or

to out-of-pocket

money? and should the courts take tax consequences into account.
This case would allow the Court to reach these intertwined issues.

Finally, Austin II makes the
entation of the issues.

~learest

and cleanest pres-

The Austin litigation went through two

trials --one essentially on the defendants' "guilt" and the second solely on the measure of damages after remand by Austin I.
On the appeal from that second trial,
the

en

bane

court

were

whether

the sole questions before

tax

benefits

should

offset

recissionary damages and how those damages should be calculated.
Austin
offset
5.

issue

II
but

RECOMMENDATION:

provides
also
I

its

a

means of
unavoidable

resolving

not only

collateral

the

questions.

recommend granting cert on Austin II and

holding Salcer and Freschi.
There is a response.
I .

October 30, 1985

Chinnis

Opinion in petition

CCC
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POOL MEMO SUPPLEMEN~
S5-519, Randall v. Loftsgaarden (AUSTIN II)
No. S5-377, Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture
No. S4-1447, Salcer v. Envicon Equities

The views of the Solicitor General have come in.
lieve

I be-

it makes a convincing case that there is a Circuit split

and that the three decisions styled above have taken an erroneous
tack.

The SG argues that the greater scope of S5-519,v;andall

v. ~~

Loftsgaarden, makes it the best vehicle to address the question
r---------

presented.
1.

that

there

The SG tracks Mike's analysis
is

a

Circuit

in SS-377,

Any distinctions

split •

Freschi,

concern

tax

...-----.----~

technical details and are unimportant to this issue.
2.

The SG argues that CA2 and CAS have taken an unduly

narrow concept of actual damages.
-----·------

---

----

·----:.?'

--~---

The statutory provision limit-

-~

ing plaintiffs' awards to actual damages was to prevent dual recovery.

CA2 and CAS go beyond that purpose and allow a defendant

to keep much of his ill-gotten gain while causing the government
to foot the damages bill through tax "offsets" to a damage award.
3.

The

SG's most

telling points

are:

(1)

Making

the

defendant pay the full amount of damages rather than offsetting
that amount by putative tax savings would further the securities
laws by making fraud more costly and by increasing the awards to
private attorney generals;
windfall

absent

and

{2)

Plaintiffs do not receive a

the offset of

tax

benefits because of the

consequences of t~e damage award.

Arithmatic and my poor knowl-

edge of tax law confirm the SG's second contention.
~

with the first half of (1).

tax

I also agree

4.

Finally,

the

SG argues

that CA2

and

CA8 actually

shortchange plaintiffs because of some possible tax outcomes.
follow the argument here but I don't buy it.

I

The SG is willing

to argue that the tax code is flexible enough to prevent a windfall to plaintiffs who recover the full measure of damages from a
defendant [see
plaintiffs

~3(2)],

from

having

but not sufficiently sophisticated to keep
to

"pay twice" under

CA2

and CA8.

Any )

failure by the SG here does not affect the overall resolution of
the case.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
~=

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

March 28, 1986

Cabell
No. 85-519, Randall v. Loftsgaarden
Cert. CA8

Wed., Apr. 2 (2d case)

Question Presented
Should the tax benefits from a "fraudulent" tax shelter
go

to

an

"already-compensated"

investor

or

to

the

defrauding

seller?

I.

BACKGROUND
I

confess

at

the outset

that

I

recommended

the Court

grant on this case because of its importance in the administra-

2• .

tion of the securities and tax laws.

Al~hough

fle dry, it offers the opportunity for the

the case is a tri-

Cour~o

outline more

carefully the proper remedies for fraudulent securities sales and

~

o aid

federal securities laws.
The

facts

of

Petr s

the case are straightforward.

in-

vested in a motel that was to be both an independent source of
revenue and a tax shelter, and the motel went under.
ors

of

the

investment,

resps,

perpetrated

Despi te the failure of the

petrs.

The purvey-

several

frauds

otel, petrs di..Q receive

hthe ~
on

fJ~I-v.

anticipated tax benefits.

~ in

federal

court under

a

variety of legal

theories, and the jury found that resps had violated, inter alia,
§10 (b)

of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and §12 ( 2)

Securities
plaintiff's

Act of

1933.

recovery

~

Under

the

1933 Act,

to purchase price of the

§12(2)

of the

limits

~
fl.(;-H

1"1~

a ~

with ~~~

security -

interest - less the amount of any income received from the secuSimilarly,

rity.
under

a

10 (b)

under

action

the

1934

Act,

§28(a)

limits

to "actual damages on account of

recovery
the act

complained of."

•

CA8 affirmed the findings of liability, but remanded so

that the District Court could "allow proof of any economic
fits

received

by plaintiffs on account of

the

CIJ .? 6

ben~

investment"

and

J

"instruct the jury that the damage award must be reduced by any
value shown to have been received by the plaintiffs."
The District Court did so.

v"'

Petrs appealed to the CA8,

and the court

In an opinion that is at times

contradictory,

that under both the 1933 and 1934

~

3.

Acts,

the

ages."
does

not

read

to

plaintiffs'

CA8

started

with

incorporate
include

an

recoveries were ,limited
the

proposition

the words

that

to

although

"actual damages,"

"actual damages principle"

"actual

it

dam-

§12(2)

should be

because

( i)

the

section's language describes the same mathematics used to calculate

"actual damages";

pari

materia with

t.iA)

and '-( 2)

the 1934 act,

the 1933 act should be read

in

which does contain the phrase

"actual damages."

CAS then reasoned that "actual damages" -

particularly-e.:~

in the context of a recission action - mandated that a plaintiff
~
could recover no more than his 'net economic loss,' because the fD ~~
goal of §12 (2)

[and presumably §10 (b)]

is to return the

partie~

to their positions before the deal was ever undertaken.
Petrs made several attempts to do an end-run around the
actual damages principle that CA8 had established.
nor

Petrs argued:

1.

Tax savings are neither "income"
within the meaning of §12(2).

"received"

2.

The tax benefit rule would undo the earlier tax
savings so that at the end of the day petrs would
have neither a judicial recovery nor a tax shelter.

3.

The tax benefits should not be included under the
"collateral source rule."

4.

The ruling unjustly enriched resps by sparing them
liability in the amount of the shelter's tax savings.

5.

The ruling deprived the Government of just tax revenues.
Although these efforts were unsuccessful,

it is neces-

sary to detail their failure because petrs assert them again before this

curt.

~

1.

CA8 determined that although tax savings are not
income in an accounting sense, · they are "value received" that must be taken into account in determining the extent of damages.
CA8 also held thab
the tax benefits had been "received" because petrs
"stipulated that they have received permanent tax
benefits," and the IRS took all possible recapture
when the hotel was foreclosed in 1978.
Pet. for
Cert. All.

2.

The court also found the tax benefit rule inapposite, because that rule provides only that a taxpayer who claims a deduction resulting in a tax
benefit one year and who later obtains a recovery
or repayment in a later year must include the recover as ordinary income.
The ''collateral source doctrine\\ - e.g., benefits
from insurance are not deducted from tort damages was inapplicable because the tax benefits were not
a collateral source: although paid by a third party
(the government), they emanated directly from the
tax shelter sought by the petrs.

3.

II.

4.

The resps were not "enriched" because they had not
"'retained' any of [petrs'] consideration" and the
purpose of the securities laws "is not to penalize
defendants, but to compensate plaintiffs for any
actual monetary loss."
Id., at Al3.

5.

The court rejected the revenue reduction argument
because "the government is entitled only to those
revenues which are authorized under the tax laws."
Ibid.

DISCUSSION
Remedies

§28 (a)

and

based

§12 (2),

on

recission,
..........----.

fits,

even
it

though

possibly

allow a plaintiff to unwind

and recover his purchase price.
ty,

which

fraudulently

is unclear under

the transaction

-But where the purchased proper-

sold,

§28{a)

include

has produced economic bene-

and §12(2)

whether this value

should remain with the buyer or go the defrauding seller (through
"offset of damages").

The Court of Appeals has determined that resps, who engaged in fraudulent conduct, must do no more than simply return
to

the

plaintiff

logical

and

the

This

original consideration.

defensible

when

viewed

from

the

holding

is

perspective

of

recission, but courts construing §28{a) and §12{2) have also used
"unjust

enrichment"

principles

to

benefits to the defrauded buyer.
on recission as a measure
fects.

allocate

security's

economic

Moreover, CAS's exclusive focus

for damages has several perverse ef-

A defendant who has committed fraud is in a better posi-

tion than a party who has only breached a contract {who must pay
a plaintiff what he might have gained) •
terred less than breach of contract.

-------

Fraud is therefore de-

It also lessens incentives

for bringing private fraud actions.

A.

The Statutory Language
Petrs focus on the language of §28{a) and §12{2).

Petrs

contend that under the bulk of securities cases, §12{2) 's phrase
"income" has never been interpreted to include tax benefits, and
there is no statutory language on which a rule "applicable only
to

'tax shelters'" can rest.

Petrs further argue that §28{a) 's

"actual damages" provision appears only in the context of authorizing parallel state and federal remedies,
only

to

prevent

duplicative

recoveries

and it was designed

when

a

plaintiff

has

brought claims under both state law and federal securities statutes.

See Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 111 {CA2 1981).
Petrs'

arguments on

§12 {2)

are

fairly

accurate

state-

ments of the law, and I believe that the reading of §28{a) 's "ac-

tual damages"
and

federal

phrase.

as only preventing double recoveries under
law

is

sensible

because

of

the

context

of

state
that

But petr's statutory arguments certainly do not compel

reversal of CAS.

For example, "income" has never been interpret-

ed to include tax benefits simply because tax shelters have created securities fraud litigation only recently.

And CAS's read-

ings of "income" and "received" make sense for investments where

~r""2..t

the dominant purpose is tax shelter.
In short,

the language itself of §12(2)

_____....

and §2S(a)

of-

~

~f.r

If one had ~

fers little guidance in the disposition of this case.

-L/I-Ie

~------~----~

to chose between petr's statutory reading and CAS's interpret ~
tion, petr's is marginally more sensible because the "actual da~ages" language of §2S(a) and "actual damages" principle of §12(2)
was probably intended only to bar double recoveries under state
and federal law.

B.

The SG's "Common Law of Recission"

----

The SG as amicus in support of petr attacks CAS's "plain

-

language" reading through the "income received" phrase.
ductions and tax credits,
the

IRS and are not

ment.

Tax de-

so the argument runs, are provided by

"income received" on a partnership invest-

Under "common-law remedies of recission and restitution,"

the rescinding buyer

[petr]

had to restore to the seller

the property plus its "direct product."

SG Brief 7.

[resp]

Therefore,

"[b]ecause tax deductions and credits are derived from the Internal Revenue Code,

not from the investment property, and because

they required independent acts of the taxpayer (including genera-

tion of income) before they can come into existence, they are not
a

'direct product' of the rescinded investment requiring

ration' to the fraudulent seller."
The

SG

has

properly

recission and restitution,

Id., at 7-8.

characterized

the

common

law of

as shown by some checking fairly far

It is not convincing, however,

afield.

'resto-

to argue that tax bene-

fits are not a direct product of a tax shelter because they "emanate"
(e.g.,

from
the

the

IRS

and

because

they

depend

investors must have additional

write-offs valuable).

on

other

factors

income to make

these

Tax savings were the dominant purpose of

the limited partnershi

and of the construction itself.

The tax

savings "emanate" from the IRS precisely in the same way oil revenues from a producing wellhead "emanate" from the refinery that
purchases the crude.

Tax savings "depend" on additional income

roughly

in

way

forces.

The common law doctrine of "direct product" is meant to

the

same

exclude from damages'
purchased property .

......-------

the

value

of

oil

varies

with

market

set-offs income that is independent of the
In a tax shelter,

the arguments concerning

"independence" prove not that the tax benefits are independent of
the shelter, but rather than those benefits are intermeshed with
other economic transactions.
I

therefore do not believe

that a vote to reverse CA8

could be grounded safely on the "direct product" doctrine in the
common-law remedy of recission -

a doctrine arguendo grafted on

the §12(2) and §28(a).
For the same reasons,

I would reject the argument that /

tax savings are a "collateral source."

C.

Common-Law Remedies for Securities Fraud
Starting

with

the

proposition

that

private

remedies

under the federal securities laws supplement, not diminish, common-law
§12 (2)

remedies,
and

the

§28 (a)

SG

argues

"has afforded

that

CA8 's

interpretation

of

the perpetrators of securities

fraud a defense unknown to the common law and thus has given the
federal

remedial provisions an unduly narrow construction."

Brief 15.

Under §12(2),

SG

so the argument goes, Congress author-

ized a statutory version of the common-law remedies of recission
and

restitution

and

cause of action.
No.

84-679, pp.

also meant

to

liberalizing

the

common-law

·Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner,
8-10

(June 11, 1985).

Those pre-existing reme-

dies would not have reduced petrs' awards by the tax benefits so
neither should §12(2).
ages -

As for §28(a) -which governs lO(b) dam-

the SG contends that "actual damages"

in 1934 meant any

"nonspeculative, compensatory damages"; the purpose of the phrase
was only to prevent duplicative awards

(e.g., awards under both

~

common law and the Securities Acts).

w-crrl<..~
Because I believe that this argument presents the best

hope of providing

a

resolution to this case,
of

the

I

have taken the

SG's line of attack.

and 1934 Securities Acts derive from two separate and independent
sources

at

common

law.

~

In

setting

damages

~

under

§28(a)

and

••

§12 (2), courts

ts that focus

on harm to the

and
_....., limit recovery by the principles of

---

legal causation.

(CA8 used this approach.)

In addition, howev-

v

er, courts have also used principles of unjust enrichment, looking to the defendant's gain, and requiring the defendant to return all benefits received even if that gain exceeds plaintiff's
loss.
Under unjust enrichment, recovery is based on the benefit the defendant received "by reason of an infringement of another person's interest, or of loss suffered by the other."
st~~on

§1.

Re-

A windfall is permissible be-

cause "[i]t is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the
benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep
them."
382

Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (CAl), cert. denied,

u.s.

879 (1965)

(the best-known windfall profits case).

This

preference probably reflects courts' view that the purpose of the \
federal securities laws is to both compensate and deter.
ated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
Prof.

account

windfall
the

128, 155 (1972).

As

Loss has explained with respect to one of the provisions:

"The damages ceiling imposed by 28(a)
on

u.s.

Affili-

of

the

action complained

recovery based on

plaintiff's

loss."

in terms of 'actual damages
of'

does

not

foreclose

the defendant's benefit rather

Fundamentals

of

Securities

a

than

Regulation

1134 (1983).
It is clear that resps were unjustly enriched within the
meaning of the doctrine.
hotel

The tax shelter deal failed because the

itself was a white elephant as a result of resps'

fraud.

But the promised tax benefits from depreciation and the Investment Tax Credit still came through.

By reducing petrs' damages

by the amount of these benefits, and thereby reducing the amount

resps have to pay, CA8 effectively allocated the benefits of the
tax
,....

shelte~o ~~s

D.

Computation of Damages

rather than petrs.

There is some dispute on the question of computation of
damages and whether the Code would prevent petrs from receiving a
real windfall.

These questions reduce to complicated and techni-

cal accounting

issues.

ples discussed above,
mend

that

without

you

make

regard

to

They do not implicate the legal princiunless the "tail wags the dog."

your
the

decision on

mechanics

of

the

issues

computing

I recom-

in parts A-_C,

damages,

because

those mechanics will vary a great deal among similar cases and
thus provide no overarching guidance.
tual dispute among

Moreover, an apparent fac-

the parties as to what tax years are closed

makes any discussion here problematic as well as unhelpful.

III.

CONCLUSION
The pla~anguage of §12(2) and §28(a) tips the balance
~-

versing CA8 because "actual damages" - as both a phrase

-

and a principle - was meant only to avoid double recovery ~nder

--

state and federal

law~

---

The SG's argument concerning direct product and collateral

source

failed

to convince me because

tax

benefits are an

essential part of a tax shelter.
Courts have used both "bare bones" recission and "unjust
enrichment" to compute damages at common law and in Federal securities actions.

I believe CA8 erred in the circumstances of this

case by using only bare bones recission and ignoring a substan-

,.,....

tial body of law that allows damage~ to be computed uo.Qer §,28 (a)

-

-

and §12(2) on the basis of a defendant's enrichment.

-----

-

,__.___..

.........

As between the defrauded buyer and the defrauding seller,

I believe that the benefit of this bargain (the tax savings)

sho~d

be allocated t~ the buyer as a matter of federal sec~r i-

---..--

~

__
_.,_... common
c::
_,____....._______
_
ties
law,
law
securities
actions,
and common sense.

I

recommend

you

vote

to

reverse

the

judgment

of

the

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

March 28, 1986: 5:46 PM

-

Cabell

Ben. Mem.
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